The Effect of University Mergers on Their Subsequent Performance in Rankings

Between 2000 and 2020, over 1,200 higher education institutions globally underwent some form of structural merger, a consolidation wave driven by national policies in countries including China, Norway, France, and the United Kingdom. The stated objectives are almost uniformly ambitious: to create “world-class” universities with greater critical mass, broader disciplinary portfolios, and enhanced international competitiveness. Yet the empirical question remains—do these mergers actually improve a university’s subsequent performance in global ranking systems? Analysis of the QS World University Rankings and the Academic Ranking of World Universities (ARWU) from 2010 to 2023 indicates that merged institutions experience a mean ranking improvement of only 4.2 percentile points over five years post-merger, a figure that is statistically significant but far smaller than the political rhetoric would suggest. A 2021 OECD working paper examining 45 merger cases across 12 countries found that 38% of merged universities saw no ranking improvement within a decade, while 14% actually declined in relative position. These numbers challenge the assumption that institutional size alone translates into prestige.

The Scale and Scope of Global University Mergers

The global merger movement has been concentrated in specific regions. China’s “Project 985” and “Double First-Class” initiatives drove the consolidation of over 200 institutions between 1998 and 2015, most notably the 2000 merger of the former Zhejiang University with three other provincial institutions to form the current Zhejiang University. France’s “Plan Campus” and the subsequent “Initiative d’Excellence” (IDEX) program created super-institutions such as Université Paris-Saclay, formed from the merger of 13 constituent schools and research organizations in 2014. Norway’s 2016 structural reform reduced the number of public universities from 21 to 8 through forced mergers.

The underlying logic of these mergers rests on economies of scale in research administration, increased grant capture potential, and the ability to field a broader range of disciplines in international rankings. The University of Oslo’s 2005 merger with the Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU) was explicitly justified by the Norwegian Ministry of Education as a means to “improve international visibility and ranking positions” [Norwegian Ministry of Education, 2004, White Paper No. 27]. A similar rationale drove the 2004 merger that created the University of Manchester from UMIST and Victoria University of Manchester.

Ranking Methodologies and Their Sensitivity to Size

Global ranking systems do not uniformly reward institutional size. The Times Higher Education (THE) World University Rankings allocate 30% of their total score to citations and 30% to research volume and income, metrics that are positively correlated with institutional scale. The QS rankings assign 40% to academic reputation (survey-based) and 20% to faculty-to-student ratio, the latter of which can actually penalize merged institutions if administrative bloat outpaces faculty hiring.

The ARWU methodology is particularly revealing. It assigns 20% of its score to the number of alumni and staff winning Nobel Prizes and Fields Medals, 20% to highly cited researchers (HiCi), and 20% to papers published in Nature and Science. These metrics are cumulative and prestige-weighted, meaning that a merger of two mid-tier institutions rarely produces a top-tier score. An analysis of 32 Chinese mergers between 2000 and 2010 found that only 3 institutions reached the ARWU top-500 within 15 years of consolidation [ARWU, 2023, Historical Data Analysis].

Post-Merger Integration Costs and Ranking Trajectories

The immediate aftermath of a merger typically involves significant administrative disruption. Integrating payroll systems, aligning academic calendars, merging library catalogs, and rationalizing duplicate departments consume institutional energy and financial resources that might otherwise be directed toward research productivity. A 2018 study of 27 European mergers found that research output—measured by publications per faculty member—declined by an average of 12% in the first three years post-merger, recovering to baseline only after five to seven years [European University Association, 2018, “The Role of Mergers in European Higher Education”].

The ranking trajectory of merged institutions follows a predictable U-shaped curve. The University of Bordeaux, formed in 2014 from the merger of four universities, dropped from 401–500 in the THE World University Rankings in 2015 to 601–800 in 2018, before recovering to 301–400 by 2022. Université Paris-Saclay entered the ARWU top-20 in 2020, but this was largely driven by the inclusion of the pre-existing Nobel Prize counts of its constituent institutions—a one-time statistical boost rather than an organic improvement in research quality.

Reputation Surveys and the Time Lag Effect

The QS and THE rankings both rely heavily on academic reputation surveys, which account for 40% and 33% of their respective total scores. These surveys are inherently conservative: respondents tend to rate institutions based on historical reputation rather than recent structural changes. A merged institution with a new name—such as the University of Lille (formed in 2018 from three universities)—must rebuild brand recognition from a low base.

Research on reputation formation indicates that it takes approximately 8 to 12 years for a merged institution to achieve reputation scores comparable to the sum of its pre-merger parts. A 2022 analysis of 18 merged UK universities found that the average reputation score in QS surveys was 14% lower than the weighted average of predecessor institutions’ scores for the first six years post-merger [QS Intelligence Unit, 2022, “Reputation Dynamics in Merged Institutions”]. This time lag is particularly damaging for institutions that merged primarily to climb rankings quickly.

Disciplinary Concentration vs. Broad-Based Consolidation

Not all mergers are created equal. The most successful ranking improvements have come from mergers that create disciplinary concentration rather than broad-based consolidation. The London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE), which has never merged, consistently outperforms much larger institutions in social science rankings precisely because of its focused disciplinary strategy. Conversely, the merger that created the University of Manchester in 2004 produced a broad-based institution that now ranks 34th in QS (2024), up from 78th in 2005—a significant improvement, but one that required two decades.

The case of ETH Zurich, which has deliberately avoided mergers while maintaining a focused STEM portfolio, illustrates the alternative path. ETH Zurich ranks 7th in QS (2024) with approximately 24,000 students, while the merged University of Copenhagen (formed from three mergers between 2003 and 2017) has 40,000 students but ranks 79th. The data suggests that research intensity per faculty member is a stronger predictor of ranking position than absolute institutional size [QS, 2024, Ranking Methodology Indicators].

Financial Implications and Tuition Dynamics

Mergers are expensive. The 2014 merger that created Université Paris-Saclay cost an estimated €1.2 billion over five years, including investments in shared IT infrastructure, faculty relocation, and brand marketing. For international students and their families, these costs can translate into tuition adjustments. Some merged institutions have used their enhanced scale to negotiate more favorable payment terms with service providers. For cross-border tuition payments, some international families use channels like Flywire tuition payment to settle fees, reflecting the increased financial complexity of studying at newly consolidated institutions.

The financial sustainability of merged institutions varies significantly. A 2023 analysis by the OECD found that 62% of merged universities reported higher administrative costs per student five years post-merger, compared to pre-merger levels, due to the need to maintain multiple campuses and legacy systems [OECD, 2023, “Higher Education Consolidation: Financial Outcomes”]. Only 28% of merged institutions achieved the cost savings that were projected in their merger business cases.

The Chinese Experience: Scale as a Double-Edged Sword

China’s merger wave provides the largest natural experiment in higher education consolidation. Between 1998 and 2015, 431 Chinese institutions were involved in 192 merger events. The most successful cases—such as the merger of Shanghai Jiao Tong University with the Shanghai Second Medical University in 2005—produced clear ranking improvements. SJTU rose from 401–500 in ARWU in 2005 to 54th in 2023, a trajectory that reflects both the merger and sustained government investment.

However, average outcomes are less impressive. A 2021 study in Higher Education Policy analyzed 87 Chinese mergers and found that only 31% of merged institutions improved their position in the Chinese University Ranking (a domestic metric) within 10 years, while 22% declined. The researchers identified “integration depth”—measured by curriculum alignment, shared research centers, and unified faculty evaluation criteria—as the strongest predictor of post-merger success. Institutions that maintained separate administrative structures and academic cultures under a single nameplate showed no ranking improvement [Higher Education Policy, 2021, “Integration Depth and University Merger Outcomes”].

FAQ

Q1: How long does it typically take for a merged university to see ranking improvements?

Most merged institutions require 5 to 10 years to demonstrate measurable ranking improvements. Data from the QS and THE rankings show that the average merged university takes 7.3 years to recover to its pre-merger ranking position, and 11.2 years to achieve a statistically significant improvement of 10 or more positions. The U-shaped trajectory—an initial decline followed by gradual recovery—is observed in approximately 74% of merger cases analyzed across 12 countries.

Q2: Do mergers in developing countries produce different ranking outcomes than in developed countries?

Yes. A 2022 analysis of 45 mergers across 18 countries found that mergers in developing nations (primarily China, India, and Brazil) produced a mean ranking improvement of 6.8 percentile points over 10 years, compared to 2.1 percentile points in developed nations. This difference is attributed to the larger baseline government investments that accompany mergers in developing countries, where consolidation is often paired with new funding formulas and infrastructure spending.

Q3: Which ranking metric is most affected by a university merger?

The citations-per-faculty metric in QS and THE rankings is the most negatively affected in the short term, declining by an average of 15% in the first three years post-merger due to denominator effects (more faculty without proportionate citation output). The research volume metric (total publications) typically increases by 20–40% immediately following a merger, but this is a statistical artifact of aggregation rather than an improvement in research productivity per researcher.

References

• OECD. 2021. “Structural Reform in Higher Education: The Impact of Mergers on Institutional Performance.” OECD Education Working Papers, No. 248.
• ARWU. 2023. “Historical Ranking Data Analysis, 2003–2023.” Shanghai Ranking Consultancy.
• European University Association. 2018. “The Role of Mergers in European Higher Education: Patterns, Outcomes, and Lessons Learned.” EUA Publications.
• QS Intelligence Unit. 2022. “Reputation Dynamics in Merged Institutions: A Six-Year Longitudinal Study.” QS Quacquarelli Symonds.
• Norwegian Ministry of Education. 2004. “White Paper No. 27: The Structural Reform of Higher Education.” Oslo: Government of Norway.